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Abstract 
After the millions of wartime displaced citizens had been forcibly returned to the Soviet 
Union after the Second World War, the Soviet Union inaugurated a new type of campaign in 
the mid-1950s to get all the remaining Soviet citizens and former émigrés from Soviet-
occupied areas to migrate back. In this campaign, the Soviets used all the means of mass 
communication they were able to produce, especially radio combined with the press and 
direct contact with people.  The campaign was not very successful, at least not among the 
people it was supposed to lure back: people residing in Europe. However, many people, 
especially from Latin America, migrated back to the Soviet Union, only to be disappointed, 
just as the people who had migrated to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. 
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Short history of Russian Emigration in the mid-20
th century 
 
In the 20
th century, the migration of Russians to lands outside the borders of “Rodina,” as 
the Russian motherland is called, is discerned to have four distinct peaks. The first wave of 
emigration took place after the collapse of the Russian Empire and during the Revolutionary 
period of 1917-1922. In all, over two million people left during this period.  The majority of 
those who left were at odds with the Bolsheviks (who were in charge from October 1917) and 
had been on the losing side in the Russian Civil War. Even if these individuals had wanted to 
migrate back to the Soviet Union, they were unwanted there. Instead of returning to motherland, 
they formed their own communities outside the Soviet Union, which are sometimes called Russia 
Abroad – “zarubezhnaia Rossiia” (e.g. Raeff 2005). 
The second wave of emigration occurred as a consequence of World War II. For twenty 
years, only a few people had been able to move beyond the Soviet borders, but by 1945, there 
were five million Soviet citizens who found themselves displaced. These people posed a problem 
not only for the Soviet authorities but for the western allied powers, too. In the German area, 
there were forced workers, prisoners, and Soviet citizens who needed to be resettled (Salomon 
1991). The Soviet Union managed to get the majority of these people, as well as those from areas 
occupied by the Western Allied Powers, back into the Soviet Union, due in part to the naiveté of 
US politicians about Soviet motivations, but also as a result of Joseph Stalin’s insistence. The 
West participated in these efforts to repatriate of Soviet citizens, even when its people had to be 
returned by force to the Soviet zones of occupation. 
Perhaps the most chronologically extensive was the third wave of emigration, consisting 
of dissidents, exiles, and non-returnees, all of whom managed to leave the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War and before the perestroika in the late 1980s. This wave also included a significant 
number of Jewish people, who were allowed to move outside the Soviet Union after some 
international wrestling over their rights (Roi 1991; Buwalda 1997). This migration turned from a 
trickle into a stream, forming the fourth wave of emigration, and ultimately contributing to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union before peaking in the early- and mid-1990s. (Zlotnik 1998).  
Each of these waves of emigration has its own distinct historical features. The essence, 
however, is that the 20
th Century saw a major outflow of people from the Russian, and later 
Soviet territory, forming a considerable body of people who were of interest to the Moscow 
governments, which were ever-concerned about propaganda and world image. During the Soviet 
era, when émigrés outside the Iron Curtain were believed to be a source of potential 
misinformation that could spread outward, luring these individuals back became important to the 
government. 
The purpose of this article is not to provide a complete history of Russian emigration but 
rather to analyze the communication strategies and technologies that political operatives used to 
make contact with and lure émigrés back to their homeland. I will concentrate on the efforts of 
the post-Stalin Soviet government to reach the Russian-speaking world outside its borders, 
primarily through radio broadcasts. Although technologies may have changed since then, 
particularly with the advent of the Internet, politicians with hidden agendas may still use 
technology to communicate with Diasporas. 
In the case of the Soviet Union, its aim was to persuade emigrants to move back to their 
homeland or, at the very least, to make such individuals feel and speak positively of their 
homeland and less inclined to act out against it. In short, the Soviet agenda was, wherever 
possible, to win over the hearts of its former citizens, and they spared no effort in doing so. Most Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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of the existing literature on the emigration of Russians is focused on the first wave, or the so-
called white emigration. Another wave of major interest to historians has been the Russian 
Jewish emigration, particularly from the 1960s onwards. (This particular wave of emigration 
drew international interest, especially in Europe, with the demise of the Soviet Union, at which 
time there was pronounced fear of mass migration toward the West (see e.g. Shevtsova 1992). 
These fears, however, were never realized to the extent that had been feared initially, especially 
by the Western European governments.) When compared to these first and fourth waves of 
emigration, however, the second and third waves have been much less studied. 
 
The second and third waves 
 
The second and third waves of Russian emigration in the 20
th Century and the 
repatriation of these individuals became a near obsession for the Soviet government. Even upon 
the return of many emigrants, the government appeared obsessed with containing the threat these 
individuals were perceived to pose to the well-being of the state. Of the almost five million 
Soviet citizens who were returned to Soviet-controlled areas in 1945, many faced camp 
sentences and persecution upon their return, as they were considered suspicious after being 
exposed to foreign influences. Although the Soviet government needed primarily to focus its 
energies on postwar reconstruction, it was unwilling to have masses of people spreading 
potentially harmful information about the Soviet Union during a delicate international situation. 
Thus, the Soviet government dedicated a significant percentage of its energies to returning its 
emigrants to their homeland and monitoring their whereabouts upon their return.  
This explicit interest in Russian emigration was something new to Soviet authorities. 
However, not all emigrants were of equal interest. Of primary interest to the Soviets were those 
who comprised the second wave of emigration not those who had left in the first wave. (Indeed, 
before WWII, many first-wave emigrants were even deprived of their citizenship and became 
stateless, as they were unable or unwilling to accept any other citizenship.) Although some 
groups of first-wave émigrés returned to their homeland as a consequence of international 
agreements signed by the Soviet government, the Soviets did not generally seek or encourage the 
re-emigration of first-wave individuals, nor did first-wave émigrés ever return in droves. Even 
after WWII, the Soviet government remained generally unwilling to encourage return migration 
of these people (Ginsburgs 1957).  (Rare exceptions to this involved non-Russian minorities, like 
Armenians. In 1946-47 there were some 80,000 Armenians returning to Soviet Armenia, and 
some 30,000 more in Turkey who were denied exit visas) (Ginsburgs 1957). The majority of the 
repatriation efforts in year immediately following the war, the Soviet government concentrated 
specifically on getting back those individuals who had been displaced during war-time and 
people who had somehow managed to avoid returning.  
Most of the people who returned to the Soviet Union during the immediate postwar years 
did so because of the Soviet government’s insistence that they do so. With few exceptions, 
Soviet authorities primarily exploited diplomatic channels and pressed foreign governments to 
assist in the returning of Soviet citizens, disregarding the wishes of the people themselves. So 
successful were these efforts that by the start of the Cold War, only a few hundred thousand of 
the original five million Soviet emigrants remained in the West. However, as the Cold War 
started to gain momentum Western governments would no longer cooperate in efforts to forcibly 
return individuals to the Soviet Union. This change in political climate forced Soviet authorities Journal of International and Global Studies 
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to think of new ways to appeal directly to the emigrants themselves and encourage them to 
consider repatriation.  
These remaining wartime exiles (a majority of whom lived in Western-occupied areas of 
Germany and Austria) were the focus of the early Soviet measures to repatriate individuals 
through direct appeal, as opposed to by force or with the assistance of other governments. The 
Soviets had little choice; the United Nations, in response to complaints from Western 
governments opposed to the involuntary return of peoples to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, ultimately resolved the issue in favor of the West in 1951 (Solomon 1991, 218-221; 
Loescher & Scanlan 1986, 15-16). After the UN’s decision, the Soviet government accused 
western governments of “preventing” 247,000 Soviet and East European citizens from returning 
to their homeland. The Soviets also alleged that Western governments were disseminating fascist 
propaganda among the refugees in question, that the Western governments pressured refugees to 
remain in the West, or that Western governments intended to exploit these individuals as a 
source of cheap labor (Ginsburgs 1957, 352). Needless to say, these claims were mostly without 
basis. Certainly, Western governments hardly encouraged Eastern bloc emigrants to return to 
their homelands, but neither were there major efforts to intern or exploit them.   
Without the cooperation of Western governments to aid in the return of their citizens, the 
Soviets found themselves needing to appeal directly to their citizens abroad, and they needed to 
be creative about it. This campaign started with inauguration of the Committee on Return to 
Homeland, “Komitet za vozvrashcheniu na Rodinu” in Russian, often also called the Soviet 
Repatriation Committee. This committee, set up in East Berlin, was first led by officers of the 
Soviet Army. Not only was the participation of the victorious Red Army likely intended to give 
prestige to the committee, but it also reflected the priority of this work in the eyes of the 
government. Not a civilian affair even in preceding years, the repatriation of Soviet-born 
emigrants became the charge of the Red Army, and even the KGB, the Soviet secret police, 
became deeply involved in persuading people from abroad to return to their homeland.  
Thus, beginning in the spring of 1955, the Committee on Return to Homeland was 
headed by major general Nikolai F. Mikhailov, himself a German wartime prisoner. East Berlin 
was chosen as the location for the Committee not only because of its proximity to West German 
territory, which the Soviet government believed to pose the greatest threat to Soviet sovereignty, 
but also because it was the temporary home to thousands of Soviet citizens. Housing the 
committee in East Berlin would also permit quick reactions to any Western countermeasures, in 
addition to which, it was conveniently located along the channel through which many of the 
returnees would eventually make their way to their native land. Furthermore, in addition to its 
convenient location, East Berlin had the additional advantage of being technologically prepared 
for a mass communication campaign. As radio emerged during the war as one of the primary 
methods of communication, Soviet-occupied Germany had the necessary facilities in place, 
ready to be used by the Soviet Committee. While Berlin had come to be known as one of the 
post-Soviet hubs for Russian emigration, it now also assumed the role of being one of the centers 
from which Russian and Soviet emigration was addressed by the Soviet officials. 
 
On sources and methodology concerning Soviet emigration 
 
Although we know that the Soviet Repatriation Committee occupied a crucial place with 
regard to research on Soviet and Russian re-emigration during the early Cold War era, the 
existence of the committee also poses a problem for anyone wishing to examine Soviet Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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emigration. While many Soviet archives are currently well organized and open, a collection that 
would hold documents produced by this organization is either missing or has been kept apart 
from the files of those organizations that later inherited the staff, materials, and functions of the 
initial committee. 
Indeed, this initially ostensibly army-related committee quickly evolved in a more 
conciliatory direction, changing its name in 1959 to “The Committee on Return to Homeland and 
Development of Cultural Relations with Compatriots.” Then, in 1963, the original aim of the 
committee was dropped altogether from the title of the organization, and it became “The Soviet 
Committee on Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad,” the predecessor to the present-day 
organization, “Rodina,” which carries on the work of contacting Russians according to the needs 
of the government (and it seems that such work has notably increased in the first decade of the 
21st century).  With regard to sources, however, the early years of this organization, before it 
turned into more-or-less a civilian organization in 1963, are apparently lost. The Russian State 
Archives (GARF) holds the organization’s collections from 1963 onwards (fond 9651, entitled 
“Rodina”), but the important means for appealing to compatriots abroad were developed within 
the first eight years of the life of the organization, when it was more clearly associated with the 
military. It is possible that documents from these first eight years are stored within the Red Army 
files or, possibly, with the KGB. Unfortunately, access to such files remains beyond the reach of 
researchers. This, however, does not mean that the topic of re-emigration and Soviet efforts to 
encourage it cannot be examined; quite the opposite, in fact. 
Sources for this article come from a number of places. Archives in Moscow provide some 
insight into the changes in policy. Although the Soviet Repatriation Committees’ files cannot be 
accessed directly, its work with émigrés was considered important by the Soviet authorities at the 
time, and thus, the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee files contain materials about 
this work. The party’s files also make up for some of the missing information caused by the lack 
of access to KGB files because the KGB reported to the party’s Central Committee when asked 
to do so. Furthermore, as this chapter aims at shedding some light on the then-new technologies 
and means of luring exiles, émigrés, emigrants, and other countrymen back to the Soviet Union, 
materials for researchers interested in examining this particular use of communication 
technologies can be found by exploring the archives of such organizations as Soviet Radio (held 
in GARF) and the Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (mainly in RGANI, 
the archives of the Communist Party from 1953 onwards). Outside Russia, there are also 
collections that house materials produced by notable Russian and Soviet émigrés, which can help 
to chart their responses to Soviet measures directed toward émigré communities. Such 
collections are located at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Archives and Columbia 
University’s Bakhmeteff collection, as well as, to some extent, in the Open Society Archives in 
Budapest. Numerous personal collections, of course, can be found in archives all over the world. 
 
Means of appealing to compatriots 
 
Development of mass communications became an important factor in the relationship 
between the Soviet government and the emigrants to which it wanted to reach out. Of the means 
that existed for appealing to compatriots (or just to Russian-speaking and oriented audiences, for 
that matter), the distribution of printed materials was perhaps the most common approach. For 
the Bolsheviks, printed propaganda materials had been part of their basic work since the party 
was first formed, long before the Revolutions of 1917. However, after the October Revolution, Journal of International and Global Studies 
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the Soviet government actively sought the newest forms of mass communication available, be 
they motion pictures or radio broadcasting. The Soviet government was inclined to use all 
possible means for spreading propaganda, not only so as to better reach its own population, but 
also to spread socialist propaganda abroad. Indeed, the Soviet Union was one of the first to use 
radio widely for the purpose of spreading propaganda, starting in the 1920s (see especially 
Goriaeva 2000 and Gorjajewa 2000). Although prime radio air-time was given to domestic 
broadcasts, foreign audiences were also targeted as early as the 1930s. The post-WWII years, 
however, brought changes related to the audiences of Soviet international broadcasting.  
Radio Moscow’s international service had, until that time, been primarily targeted at 
foreign audiences speaking languages like English, German, and French, as well as at foreign 
audiences on the North American continent. However, in the 1940s, when the Soviets took over 
some German radio installations, Radio Volga started targeting Russian language speakers, 
airing broadcasts targeted at the large numbers of Red Army soldiers stationed outside Soviet 
borders throughout the Cold War period. As such, when the repatriation committee began their 
Russian-language broadcasts from Germany, these broadcasts represented only one of many 
instances of international broadcasting activity    being undertaken by the Soviet government. 
However, these broadcasts were remarkable in several particular ways. First, they were the first 
international  broadcasts targeted at émigré audiences in their own native languages. Second, 
they marked a changed in Soviet policy with respect to emigration. Prior to these post-war 
repatriation efforts, the Soviet government had historically kept silent about any Soviet émigrés 
and exiles, declining even to admit their existence. Only after the war and after Stalin’s death did 
the Soviets consider contacting such individuals. Ultimately, of course, these efforts became 
quite aggressive in nature, and the Soviet government appeared quite possessed in its efforts to 
communicate with émigré and exile groups all over the world. 
The primary targets for radio appeals being broadcast in the latter part of the 1950s were 
emigrants who had left the Soviet Union within the previous three to five years. This can be 
deduced from the fact that the programs had sections which introduced Soviet citizens appealing 
straight to their husbands, sons, nephews, or old friends to return. More recent émigrés would 
typically have had more intimate relationships with people still living in the Soviet Union. These 
appeals most typically took the form of letters that were read on air and that were later reprinted 
in the pages of magazines directed to émigrés, including a magazine published by the 
repatriation committee itself. Quite often the writers of such letters described how they were 
missing their loved ones or explained that a loved one was sick or otherwise desperately seeking 
contact with a certain individual abroad. This tactic was highly effective, and, even when it could 
not tempt Soviet emigrants or exiles to return, it surely affected their resolve and discouraged 
them from taking action against the Soviet Union, as such broadcasts and publications provided 
them with concrete evidence that Soviet authorities indeed had close dealings with their relatives 
back home (Critchlow 1995, 57-58). The interesting thing is that these sections in the 
committee’s magazines and programs did become popular, no matter how painful an experience 
it must have been for exiles to read them. In these appeals to compatriots, perhaps the most 
interesting feature of these letters is their explicit attempt to exploit radio as a means of directly 
appealing to the feelings of individuals abroad. 
The radio established by the repatriation committee was originally called “Radio on 
Return to Homeland,” and a journal carried the same name, without the word radio in the title. 
The radio targeted centers of Soviet exiles and émigrés, like Munich, Paris, and bigger cities in 
North America. Broadcasts were not only in Russian, but in numerous other languages. In Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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addition to existing Soviet media directed abroad, the committees’ weekly journal and radio, 
with the Kremlin’s aid, circulated certain programs over different channels, including Radio 
Volga, Radio Kiev, Armenia, and others broadcasting to their target national audiences outside 
the Soviet Union. Even smaller Soviet minorities, like Estonians, had programming in their own 
language.  
As the smallest of Soviet republics, Soviet Estonia illustrates the importance given this 
work by the Soviet authorities in the late 1950s. The Central Committee in Moscow was 
constantly in touch with the Estonian Party secretary about foreign radio broadcasts, asking how 
the work was proceeding. The Communist Party Secretary of Estonia, Johannes Käbin, wrote 
back explaining that Estonian’s émigrés abroad were being consistently targeted for return by 
Soviet-Estonian propaganda measures. Émigrés in Sweden, the USA, and Canada (countries with 
the most important centers of Estonians abroad) received most of the Soviet-Estonian 
propaganda material (Käbin 1958). 
However small these Estonian émigré populations were (circulated materials to Sweden 
numbered only 1706 and to the USA numbered only 1058), Soviet authorities wanted to extend 
the radio propaganda to these populations so that it would support and patch gaps left by printed 
materials (Käbin 1958). Only half a year later, Käbin went further, reasoning to party bosses in 
Moscow that Estonian audiences in North America were not hearing enough Estonian language 
programming from Soviet Estonia and asked for a 30 minute programming slot, two-three times 
a week (Käbin1959). (Estonian language programs were already sent through the Repatriation 
Committee’s system, but only to Europe) (Vishnevsky 1959). This also illustrates the problems 
of the bureaucratic Soviet system: instead of being able simply to extend the Estonian language 
programming to a new continent, the Repatriation Committee needed the Estonian Communist 
Party to request programming officially. 
As the smallest of official Soviet nations, the example of Soviet efforts to repatriate 
Estonians reveals how important this work was in the eyes of Soviet authorities. However, it 
needs to be taken into account that while most of the Soviet displaced persons were returned to 
the Soviet Union, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were in a different position. The United 
States and Great Britain refused to acknowledge that these Baltic Republics had been lawfully 
incorporated into the Soviet Union and declined to return any Soviet citizens or earlier émigrés 
from these areas, despite Soviet insistence. From 1939 to 1944, some 70,000 Estonians had left 
Estonia, primarily for Germany and Sweden. After the war, those in Germany and in refugee 
camps elsewhere headed to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia; by the 
beginning of the 1950s, there were almost 90,000 Estonians living outside the Soviet Union 
(Kulu & Tammaru 2000). Although small in number and dispersed across the globe, this group 
was perceived to be important enough to be contacted repeatedly by the Soviet propagandists. 
Similarly, when the Lithuanian communist party submitted a request to the Central Committee in 
Moscow in 1955 for an increase in funding for the work with Lithuanians in the USA, Uruguay, 
and elsewhere, the request was fulfilled. The estimate then was that of 750,000 Lithuanians in 
capitalist countries, about a third harbored benevolent feelings toward the Soviet Union and 
worked in concert with Soviet aims, thus becoming an important asset to the Soviet propaganda 
campaign (Vinogradov 1955). 
As for additional content of the radio the programs, radio largely provided a channel 
through which the Soviet government could propagandize its views. The content of such 
programs was assumed to appeal to émigrés and those related to them, for it contained (largely 
propagandized) information regarding policies of concern to émigrés (i.e. what would happen Journal of International and Global Studies 
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upon their return to Soviet soil, etc). The content of these broadcasts followed the guidelines set 
for the radio broadcasts for audiences in capitalist countries in general (see e.g. Ideological 
Commission of the Soviet Communist Party, 1959). Whereas the Soviet authorities had 
previously pressured Western governments to force repatriation of Soviet exiles and émigrés, the 
Soviets were now engaged in a series of more sophisticated measures that were aimed at the 
exiles themselves, appearing to help them overcome anxiety and fear of the persecution they 
anticipated experiencing upon their return to the Soviet Union. The Soviet government went so 
far as to enact laws providing full amnesty for those who would return to the Soviet Union. 
Amnesty was promised even  to those  who had been involved in anti-Soviet activities after 
WWII, even if they had fought against the Soviet army in the ranks of the German army (which 
was mainly a reference  to defected Soviet general Vlasov, who had lead and helped to organize 
Soviet POW’s and other volunteers into an armed force under Nazi-tutelage). Such laws, of 
course, played heavily into the propagandized messages of the repatriation broadcasts. In fact, 
one of the first measures of the repatriation committee was to propagandize these laws (New 
York Times 1955).  
Thus, the repatriation committee had to be creative in order to make these promises of 
amnesty credible. In order to achieve this, they utilized the testimony of persons who had 
actually returned and benefited from such amnesty. As many actual names as possible were 
mentioned in order to make the stories of their supposed amnesty convincing to listeners. 
Especially valuable were the testimonies of those who had actually been active in anti-Soviet 
work, so as to point out that even they were given amnesty. Those who had journalistic talents, 
like Galina Oleinik, who returned in mid-1950s, were believed by the committee to be top 
candidates for use in propagandized appeals specifically aimed at those who  had known them 
abroad (e.g Oleinik 1958; Oleinik 1966; New York Times 1958a). Often, however, the Soviets 
had to settle for reading aloud letters that were allegedly written by such returnees. Fedor 
Borzykin-Podgornyi (who had most likely lived in Germany under a false name, which was the 
name his family used in the Soviet Union) was a good example of this. He had returned to Soviet 
soil in August 1956, but only after running into trouble with West German police. He was said to 
have been happily united with his family, but instead of appearing personally on radio 
broadcasts, his letters, in which he encouraged his fellows who remained in Germany to refrain 
from anti-Soviet activities and return to their motherland, were read aloud by someone else, 
making the authenticity of his words somewhat less clear (Borzykin-Podgornyi 1956). His 
motivation, however, might have been, at least in part, to avoid possible sentencing in West 
Germany. 
Eventually, however, Soviet authorities realized that amnesty alone was not enough to 
persuade even homesick war-time collaborators to return to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the 
committee’s programs began to feature promises that were closely linked to general socialist 
propaganda about good jobs, free education for the children of returnees, and social security, 
which all emigrants were currently lacking in Germany and possibly elsewhere. Soviet masters 
of propaganda were well aware that exiles in German refugee camps were uncertain about their 
futures, and new Soviet promises were believed to appeal to these individuals and lure a number 
of them to return. In order to solidify these promises, people from the ranks of those who had 
chosen re-emigration were picked to share their experiences about their return and their happy 
new lives in the Soviet Union. Handing a microphone to ordinary people unconnected with the 
government was a novelty in the Soviet Union, and, although it was initially used sparingly, it 
was believed to bring credibility to the broadcasts to émigrés abroad, who might possibly have Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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recognize the interviewees (Kalinin 1956; Bibikov 1956).  In the meantime, the extensive 
propaganda machinery in use by the committee and the committee’s connections abroad were 
aimed at illustrating the miseries and sad fates of Soviet citizens in the West. Quite interestingly, 
attacks on the West often included stories of alcoholism among Soviet emigrants residing in the 
West, as if the same problem did not exist in the Soviet Union (e.g. Taradankin1961). The KGB 
even took the trouble of stealing a written document strictly prohibiting drinking during work 
time from a US organization that employed Soviet émigrés and used this as evidence to its 
audience that alcoholism was truly widespread among émigrés in the West (Bogdanov 1962). 
By circulating materials in print and via radio broadcasts, the committee aimed to extend 
its reach to all émigrés in the West. Indeed, the development of radio technology provided the 
committee with a new way not only to popularize its legal measures and initiatives targeted at 
émigré populations, but also to dispute émigrés’ views of the Soviet Union. Shortwave 
technology, which had been developed during the war, was now exploited in connection with 
émigré affairs. But shortwave technology was not without its own problems. While in the Soviet 
Union shortwave technology had quickly become one of the primary forms of reaching distant 
parts of the country, in the West, there were far fewer radios that were able to pick distant 
signals. Thus, the estimation presented to the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee was 
that only 0.1% of US radios had the means to pick up Soviet radio signals. In contrast, the same 
percentage for US broadcasts picked up in the Soviet Union was well over 50% (Ilichev et al 
1958). Thus, although the West might otherwise have had a sizable audience for Soviet radio 
broadcasts, the size of the potential target audience was drastically reduced by the lack of 
suitable equipment. It was thus important to supplement these broadcasts with printed materials 
that could be mailed directly to recipients. 
 
The Émigré question becomes politicized 
 
These measures, however, merely created the framework for Soviet efforts and for 
subsequent propaganda. Obviously, there had been ample opportunity for émigrés to voluntarily 
return to Soviet soil at any time. When no great waves of repatriation took place, the Soviet 
authorities fabricated a story about how Western governments were preventing as many as 
100,000 Soviet citizens in West Germany from returning home. This claim grew into a dispute 
between the West German and Soviet governments, and eventually drove Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer to challenge the Soviet government to produce a list of those 100,000 Soviet citizens 
in West Germany who wanted to go home. He insisted that no-one was prevented from 
returning, and despite the counter propaganda efforts, centers for Soviet refugees had always had 
instructions on how to contact Soviet officials if anyone was actually interested in returning. 
Thus, when Soviet authorities finally brought a list of 31 people who had petitioned to get back 
to the Soviet Union, it turned out that all 31 of these individuals were at that time in German 
prisons for crimes they had recently committed (New York Times 1956a). These people, thus, 
had reasons to hope for Soviet amnesty and seek repatriation. Clearly, however, this situation 
was not exactly consistent with the picture the Soviets had attempted to portray.  
Within a year, over 300 refugees left West Germany for the Soviet bloc. This was not a 
great share of the more than 200,000 East European exiles in West Germany, but it suggested 
that not everything was well with exiles. In its cover story, The New York Times tried to appeal 
to politicians to improve the conditions of exiles in Western nations through a story of an 
individual exile who had fought against the Soviet Union during the Second World War but who Journal of International and Global Studies 
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was now heading back to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that he was personally convinced that 
he would be imprisoned upon his return. The New York Times considered this individual’s story 
a sign that all was not right with Soviet exiles in West Germany and that something must be done 
to improve their conditions there (Olsen 1956).  It also suggests that the Soviet campaign was 
believed to produce some results. It might also be the case that the repatriation committee’s 
clandestine activities the West (in addition to their overt propaganda efforts) alarmed the US. 
Propaganda and covert persuasion were not the only measures being taken to encourage 
repatriation, however. The most explicit repatriation tactics were reserved for Soviet exiles who 
had taken an active role in political émigré organizations and activities or in any anti-Soviet 
organizations. In the case of these individuals, direct contact was made, with agents of the KGB 
approaching them directly. To maximize shock value, agents might personally deliver messages 
from the relatives of politically-active émigrés, make nightly phone calls to such individuals, or, 
though in very few cases, resort to violence. This face-to-face contact with émigrés suggests that 
Soviet repatriation efforts were extensive in the late 1950s. It also suggests that a secondary 
objective of the repatriation campaign was to demoralize and marginalize those exiles working 
actively against the Soviet Union abroad. In short, the Soviets needed to ensure that its image 
and/or any diplomatic visits made by Soviet representatives to counties in the West would not be 
marred by anti-Soviet demonstrations or political activity, particularly not such activity 
conducted by former Soviet residents.  
This need to squelch dissidence was in some cases expressed quite clearly, especially 
when high-profile Soviet delegations visited a capitalist country. Khrushchev’s visits, for 
example, were an occasion on which Soviet authorities were especially sensitive to any 
disturbances. Thus, when, in 1964, Khrushchev was about to embark on a Scandinavian tour, the 
Soviet embassy in Stockholm requested that the more than 31,500 Estonian and Latvian émigrés 
in Sweden be accounted for and established measures to prevent them from harassing 
Khrushchev’s delegation or from protesting the Soviet presence in the Baltic Republics. These 
measures included propaganda directed toward these émigrés as well as invitations to the leaders 
of politically active émigré groups to visit Soviet Estonia and Latvia so that they might 
themselves see the positive developments taking place in these countries, thus winning over such 
individuals and, potentially, reducing their inclination to act out against the Soviet Union upon 
their return to their Western homes (Belokhvostikov 1964). The Americans noted this change, 
particularly the Soviet invitations to visitors and the contacting of people abroad (for purposes of 
propaganda). The US stated that the resources the Soviet Union and its satellites used for 
propaganda aimed at non-communist entities substantially exceeded the US resources spent on 
similar efforts (New York Times 1958b). 
The KGB had been involved in repatriation efforts from the start, and not only in for the 
purposes of scaring political activists or checking the identities of returning citizens. In the 
spring of 1956, when the repatriation efforts were still fresh, KGB involvement in the US was 
already apparent. Alexandra Tolstoy, the daughter of a famous writer, Lyev (Leo) Tolstoy, then 
residing in US, expressed her worry over those refugees from Eastern Europe who had come to 
the US under false identities. According to Tolstoy’s estimate, there were 15,000 in total, all of 
whom were targeted by Soviet agents. Soviet propaganda material was being mailed to their 
current addresses but with their original names, not the ones they had assumed. The KGB had 
thus been able to follow them, even with their new identities and knew where they lived in the 
US. Tolstoy brought forward that hundreds of refugees had approached her about their fears of 
Soviet agents turning them over to US authorities (New York Times 1956b). Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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 The lives of émigrés in the West had not, in all cases, turned out to be either pleasant or 
easy. The poor living conditions and low social status of Soviet émigrés still living in West 
German refugee camps remained a problem. The Soviet authorities, thus, concluded that after 
spending 10 years in refugee camps without proper work or chances for integration into Western 
European population, these people might be receptive to a major propaganda effort. They, 
therefore, decided to add to their highly persuasive (if not ultimately effective) propagandistic 
efforts, use of force, and subversive methods the use of new technological advancements in order 
to effect maximum impact on Soviet exiles and émigré communities. 
While the Soviets’ efforts to repatriate their lost countrymen underwent various changes, 
Western nations also undertook a range of activities with respect to the Soviet exiles, émigrés, 
and emigrants living on Western soil. Forced repatriation was given up as a practice by Western 
powers by 1947, and the practice was legally prohibited by the United Nations in 1951; thus, 
repatriation of Soviet and East-European refugees against their will was no longer practiced. On 
April 24, 1951, the US followed the United Nations’ recommendation not to return political 
refugees to the Soviet Union. Instead, the US would aim to find these people jobs with wages 
corresponding to those they had in the Soviet Union and would help them to settle in countries of 
their choice (Middleton 1951). For this purpose, the US State Department utilized funds like the 
Free Russia Fund by the Ford Foundation, which helped Soviet exiles to settle and assimilate 
(New York Times
 1951a; New York Times
 1951b)
1. This money would also be directed to the 
anti-Soviet work of émigrés (Schwartz 1951). As a result of such efforts, by the mid-1950s, the 
most able-bodied of the emigrants had already been allowed to emigrate to the US (from 
Germany, for example) and other countries that would accept them. Thus, those who were left 
behind in Germany were often unemployed, living in poverty, in DP camps or refugee camps, 
without the possibility to build houses, schools, or churches, and thus lacking materials to build a 
stable community (American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, 1956). 
 
Motivations to strive for increasing re-emigration 
 
To be sure, the Soviets did not grow an interest in émigré communities solely because 
they wanted people to repatriate and saw an opportunity to help them do so.  As stated earlier in 
this work, Soviet authorities had become very concerned about the anti-Soviet work of some 
émigré communities and wanted to squelch anti-Soviet activities or sentiments, even those 
occurring on distant shores. This explains why émigrés became such an obsession for Soviet 
authorities; the Soviets not only saw in repatriation an opportunity to get their citizens back, but 
they also sought to defuse perceived threats to Soviet security, believing that anti-Soviet 
sentiment would be neutralized if only émigrés could only be reached by Soviet messages. 
The anti-Soviet work that caused such an anxiety in Moscow was closely linked to 
American operations such as Rollback, which aimed to actively counter the expanding Soviet 
influence and to have a similar effect in the Soviet-occupied areas (and ultimately even within 
the Soviet Union itself) (e.g. Grose 2000). As part of this work, American officials had turned to 
Soviet émigré communities, knowing that these people knew Soviet conditions best and were, to 
the extent that they had decided to leave the Soviet Union, dissatisfied with conditions in their 
homeland. Thus, the US government urged émigrés to do the US’ bidding and engage in anti-
Soviet activities. The US’ aim was to create a united and influential body of Soviet and Russian 
émigré organizations gathered under one umbrella organization that would both produce anti-
Soviet propaganda and possibly affect popular opinion in the Soviet Union. The Soviets were, Journal of International and Global Studies 
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for their part, worried about the possibility of such a body that would represent Soviet 
nationalities abroad, and were, therefore, willing even to repatriate the émigrés who would be 
involved in such organizations. At the very least, the Soviets were keen to sow discord among 
already discordant émigré groups. 
Although most American operations with Soviet émigrés failed badly in the early 1950s, 
two important institutions were initiated and worked throughout the Cold War, namely, “Radio 
Free Europe” and “Radio Liberty.” The former broadcast to East European countries, and the 
latter to the Soviet Union in numerous local languages. It was precisely these radio broadcasts to 
Soviet audiences that raised much concern among Soviet authorities (see e.g. Mikkonen 2010). 
The majority of staff members of these radio programs were émigrés, people who knew the 
language and culture of the target areas. Radio Liberty, thus, was an émigré radio station, 
broadcasting to the Soviet Union. Speakers of Radio Liberty were people who had left the Soviet 
Union, and this raised considerable concern among Soviet authorities. Therefore, some of the 
repatriation committee’s efforts were targeted at émigrés linked with Radio Liberty and other 
similar operations. After intensive work by the Soviet Repatriation Committee, some workers of 
Radio Liberty actually chose to remigrate, and, in one case, a former Radio Liberty announcer 
became a worker for the repatriation committee’s own radio (Oleinik 1966). 
Combined with other challenges posed by American operations, this caused Soviet 
authorities to feel compelled to respond. For example, in the report compiled for the Communist 
Party’s Central Committee on foreign propaganda directed toward Soviet Ukraine, numerous 
US-inspired institutions organized by and for Ukrainian émigrés were mentioned.  Ukrainian 
language radio broadcasts to the Soviet Ukraine were noted, as were the Ukrainian Free 
University, Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and several others in London, Munich, and in 
a number of places in North America. Apart from distributing printed material in Soviet Ukraine, 
they were  said to have taken to distributing propaganda materials in neutral and developing 
countries, which endangered Soviet propaganda efforts there (Chervonenko, 1958). This made 
émigrés not only an opportunity but also a potential threat to be acted upon.   
 
The Outcome of Soviet work with émigrés 
 
Despite these active measures, the number of returnees to the Soviet Union from West 
Germany did not become significant. Instead of their originally intended target audience, the 
main source of repatriates to the Soviet Union was South America, especially Argentina, where 
there was a major émigré community of Ukrainians and other Soviet minorities. A few thousand 
of them chose to heed the call of the motherland. Most were prewar émigrés, as opposed to 
wartime exiles. Some had left the Soviet Union earlier, while others had been living in areas that 
were not part of the Soviet Union when they left before 1940. A common feature among these 
returnees was that they did not possess firsthand experience of the Stalin-era Soviet Union.  
The first major boatload of Argentine refugees, numbering 780 men, women, and 
children, left Buenos Aires in March of 1956 with brand new Soviet passports in their pockets. 
They consisted mostly of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Lithuanians (Morrow 1956). Western 
journalists closely followed their arrival at Odessa and their departure to destinations throughout 
the Soviet Union. One reporter remarked that the Soviets were ready to take everything possible 
out of this success by photographing, reporting, and even making a documentary film about the 
event. Indeed, The Soviet Repatriation Committee’s publications were filled with stories about 
happy reunions of families, of new jobs and apartments in the Soviet Union, and about the Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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general rejoicing over their return to the homeland (Mikhailov 1956). Western reporters’ access 
to an interview with repatriates, not surprisingly, was denied (Raymond 1956). 
Although the fates of these new repatriates are hard to follow, some individuals’ 
experiences can be found in sources gathered by the US authorities. These people soon became 
disillusioned and found ways to leave the Soviet Union again in future years. Most repatriates 
did not get such a chance until the late 1980s, however. Naturally, the Soviet propaganda 
machine was focused much more intensely on repatriates before they actually returned to the 
Soviet Union and was much less interested in how the repatriated individuals fared upon their 
return. It appears that after their arrival, quite a few of at least these South American repatriates 
were unhappy with their new lives. US intelligence reports gathered through interviews with 
repatriates who managed to leave the Soviet Union in the 1960s indicate that quite a few of them 
had tried for several years to apply for an exit permit back to their countries of origin. Some of 
those who managed to return had first tried to get hold of communist party identification cards, 
in order to improve their status, but had been unable to find anyone to support their applications, 
which aptly illustrates the unique form of social and cultural isolation felt by repatriated Soviet 
citizens (Radio Liberty Audience Research Department 1964b). An interview with one 
Ukrainian-Argentinean also suggested that some 500 of those who had arrived from Argentina 
would have been working in the mines of Novo-Volynsk in 1965, hardly representing jobs they 
had been looking for (Radio Liberty Audience Research Department 1966).  
Many of the stories US intelligence was able to gather were of personal tragedy. In one 
account, US agents interviewed a girl who had moved to Soviet Armenia with her family in 
1948, as a part of early repatriation efforts. Central in her story was her father, who had fought 
with the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. He had been French, of Armenian descent, 
believing in the Soviet Union, and thus, ready to take his whole family there in 1948. 
Immediately after arriving at a Soviet Black sea port, he realized his grave mistake and tried to 
get back to the ship but was denied access. Quite soon, he became a drunk, leaving his family to 
survive on its own. The only advice he gave to his daughter was to seek any possible exit from 
the Soviet Union, which she eventually did in late 1963 (Radio Liberty Audience Research 
Department 1964a). Such stories were numerous in the mid-1960s, at which time US intelligence 
was gathering reports of people who had managed to leave the Soviet Union for good. 
As long as the Cold War was on, the question of Soviet exiles and émigrés was one of 
political importance, and, therefore, US officials were interested in measures that would keep the 
re-emigration to the Soviet Union to a minimum. They, thus, did not stand passively watching 
the exiles’ morale crumble when the Soviet efforts to reach émigré communities started. US 
officials were quick to understand the threat posed by the Soviet Repatriation Committee and the 
repatriation campaign. Following the inauguration of the committee, major threats of the Soviet 
campaign were seen in the field of ideology. In order to (1) prevent the Soviet Union from 
gaining a major propaganda victory and (2) deny them the opportunity to allege that conditions 
in the West were inferior to those in the Soviet Union, US officials had to improve the lives of 
Soviet exiles. This, it was believed, would keep the movement of Soviet emigrants back to 
Soviet soil to a minimum. The return of such individuals in the thousands would have been a 
major political triumph for the Soviet authorities and would have given the Soviets a further 
political advantage in the international arena. Thus, the solution was not only to improve exiles’ 
conditions in Germany but also to enable a number of them to enter the United States (New York 
Times 1955). Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Americans, too, would also resort to clandestine activities: where there was KGB, there 
was CIA. The American Committee on Liberation from Bolshevism had been set up by the CIA 
in 1951 to create an anti-Soviet front from political émigré organizations, and it was this 
organization that was behind Radio Liberty. This organization started operations to counter the 
work of the Soviet Repatriation Committee by channeling necessary funds to anti-Soviet 
organizations for campaigns to lift exiles’ obviously low morale (American Committee for 
Liberation from Bolshevism, 1956). Although talking primarily about East-Central European 
exiles, Frank Altschul, from the Free Europe Committee, addressed the problem with Soviet 
exiles when he stated that American authorities were in a position to make “the living conditions 
of the defectors somewhat more bearable. As far as I can learn, nothing approaching…adequate 
has been done in this respect.” Instead of a coordinated struggle against Bolshevism, internal 
empire building had taken place, causing factional fighting and the crumbling of the credibility 
of American efforts with émigré communities. The Soviet campaign was considered a major 
threat in this respect (Frank Altschul’s Memo, 1955). However, first by countering the Soviet 
propaganda and also by improving the status of the remaining émigrés in West Germany, 
American authorities prevented a major influx of Soviet repatriates into to the Soviet Union. 
Instead, in fact, the flow of people went in the other direction. 
 
In search of repatriates 
 
So, what is the outcome of it all? After Soviet authorities realized, toward the 1960s, that 
there was not going to be a massive influx of repatriates, they changed the objective of their 
work with émigrés somewhat and developed new techniques. They set up relations with some 
émigré communities, especially between Soviet national republics. Representatives of these 
nationalities abroad were also encouraged to visit their homeland. The purpose of this new policy 
was, most simply, to decrease émigrés’ hostility toward the Soviet Union or, most optimistically, 
to win them over, psychologically and emotionally. The change in these objectives can be seen 
in the name change of the repatriation committee’s radio program and magazine publication, 
which went from “On Return to Homeland” to “Voice of the Homeland” (Golos Rodiny). This 
change in nature of the committee and its approaches to repatriation, of course, is itself 
something that requires another study altogether. 
The situation with work on émigrés would change drastically only when the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991. During the Soviet era, nationalities had spread over republican boundaries 
within the Soviet Union, as republican borders mattered even less than State borders in the US, 
as long as the Soviet Union existed. After the Soviet republics became independent, however, 
boundaries became a crucial issue, and boundary disputes remain problematic today. It is 
understandable, then, that the primary interest of Russian authorities has, for the last two 
decades, been fixed  on countries called “the near abroad,” such as former Soviet republics like 
Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine, all of which have sizable minority Russian 
communities (Barrington et al. 2003) . 
The difference between these current efforts compared to those of the Soviet era is that 
post-Soviet Russian programming to compatriots underlines more clearly nationalist propaganda, 
emphasizing Russianness, Russian language, and Russia as a “special” place among former 
Soviet republics.. During the Soviet era, Soviet nationalities had to be addressed against the 
Soviet background, with only limited reference to national features. While there are not many 
studies about the more recent developments with Russian re-emigration, at least with the small Mass Communications as a Vehicle to Lure Russian Émigrés Homeward 
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minorities, the end of the Soviet era did not start any major flow of people from the West back to 
newly independent countries, like Estonia. According to Kulu and Tiit (2000), the number of 
Estonians in the West has remained at the same level. In fact, there has not been any major influx 
of Estonians into former Soviet territories, not after the 1950s, nor after the independence of 
Estonia. While Russians have been moving in and out of their motherland, their migration has 
been less pronounced than the migration typical of countries that do not aim to keep their people 
in place by force, like the Soviet Union once did. 
Soviet émigré studies deserve further research if we are to grasp the significant role 
played by the Soviet émigrés in the development of the Cold War and beyond, as Russians have 
been increasingly active toward their compatriots abroad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   Head of this Russian fund was no less than George Kennan, former chief of the policy-
planning staff from the State Department.  Journal of International and Global Studies 
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